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In this paper I w i l l investigate two varieties of self-loss, 
and indicate their relation to methodological problems i n 
epistemology and ethics w h i c h have been raised by a 
number of contemporary feminist philosophers. T h e 
question of nonfeminist phi losophical sources for femi-
nist epistemology w i l l be of special, though not central, 
concern. Kant's First and T h i r d Critiques, Hegel's Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, and Heidegger's Being and Time 
w i l l occur as examples of such sources. 
Arguments i n this paper w i l l rest on the f o l l o w i n g 
assumptions: (1) "person" and "self" mutual ly entail each 
other, but differ i n meaning. (2) T o be a person is to be a 
conscious entity; for a person to undergo any conscious 
state or occurrence is to be actually self-aware and poten-
t ial ly self-reflective w i t h regard to that state or occurrence. 
(3) Self-awareness is not a manifestation of the disposit ion 
for self-reflection, but its necessary presupposit ion. (4) 
Self-awareness is an essential, merely felt component of 
experience, by virtue of w h i c h my experiences are neces-
sarily mine. It is strictly private and, therefore, nondiscur-
sive. I shal l cal l it existential awareness. (5) Self-alienation 
and self-loss are tied to the dichotomization rather than 
u n i o n of those dualities that are essential to being a con-
scious h u m a n person. H u m a n consciousness entails the 
dualities: I—you; subject—object; inner—outer; feel ing— 
thought; emotion—reason; life—death; f inite—infinite ; 
imperfect—perfect; immediate—mediate . T h i s paper 
focuses on the last two. 
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T o refer to an example of a person I use the personal 
p r o n o u n " I . " For me to have an experience is, basically, to 
be conscious of something other than myself, and to be 
aware (not conscious) of myself as being conscious. Such 
awareness is a non-intent ional felt qual i ty , essential to 
every experience. It is the q u a l i t y w h i c h W . James des-
cribes as the " w a r m t h and i n t i m a c y " that is a necessary 
constituent of my experience, and, for me, distinguishes 
my experiences f rom anyone else's. I necessarily o w n my 
experiences. They are untransferable. T h i s is the point 
that Kant makes when he says that I am aware of my 
representations as necessarily mine. Awareness is existen-
tial and subjective. It is on the basis of such existential 
awareness, that " I am conscious of the self as identical i n 
respect of the m a n i f o l d of representations that are given to 
me in an i n t u i t i o n , because I cal l them one and a l l my 
representations, and so apprehend them as constituting 
one i n t u i t i o n . " 1 T h i s identity c l a i m cannot be verified i n 
terms of what I ca l l existential awareness, just because this 
is merely inner and can, therefore, not be subsumed under 
concepts. Since the uni ty of self can neither be denied nor 
conceptualized, Kant (and Husserl) thought it necessary to 
transcendentalize the self, and thereby make it accessible to 
rational thought procedures. In Kant's view, for the unity 
of self to be viable i n metaphysics and epistemology, it 
must be capable of being thought, not merely of being felt 
(i.e., immediately intuited). W h e n Kant argues that 
" t h r o u g h inner experience I am conscious of my existence 
i n t i m e " 2 , and that this " i s identical w i t h the empirical 
consciousness of my existence" he talks as if, through 
inner experience, I am intentionally directed at my exist-
ence i n time, as if " m y existence i n t ime" were an inten-
tional object accompanying any other intentional object 
of consciousness. It is indeed true that I or anyone can 
determine the i n d i v i d u a l , to w h i c h I refer w i t h the pro-
n o u n " I , " as an entity i n time; but this is to determine me 
i n terms of those properties w h i c h mark my continuity i n 
time and, more specifically, those w h i c h constitute the 
criteria for my identity and re-identifiabil ity i n time. T h i s 
is not to determine my existence i n time. It is to determine 
what I a m objectively, not that I a m . " Inner sense, by 
means of w h i c h the m i n d intui ts itself or its inner state, 
yields indeed no i n t u i t i o n of the soul itself as an object." 3 
Furthermore, by Kant 's o w n reasoning, existence is not a 
predicate. 
W h a t I a m conscious of is determinate. I agree w i t h 
K a n t about this. T o mark the indeterminacy of my mere 
existence—it can only be felt ( immediately intuited), not 
thought—it w o u l d be appropriate to speak of existential 
awareness, rather than of consciousness of my existence. 
M y consciousness, everyone of my conscious experiences, 
is rooted i n this awareness; but, this awareness cannot 
itself be consciousness. N o consciousness wi thout existen-
t ial awareness. 4 
K a n t is often criticized, especially by feminist p h i l o -
sophers, for d ichotomiz ing feeling and thought and reject-
i n g the former i n favour of the latter. I enter into discus-
s ion w i t h h i m not just for the sake of the point , but also to 
show that, despite his commitment to the dual i ty of feel-
i n g ( intuit ion) and thought, he takes important though 
insufficient steps toward u n i f y i n g them. 
There can be existential awareness without conscious-
ness, if you l ike, i n t u i t i o n i n awareness, but not i n 
thought . These are moments i n w h i c h I a m f u l l y aware of 
my being, but not (because I cannot be) objectively con-
scious of it . Kant himself systematically a l lows for such 
occurrences i n accounting for "aesthetic experiences," 
"experiences of beauty," i n the T h i r d Critique. Aesthetic 
agreeableness belongs " to the subject's sensation, by 
w h i c h n o object is represented: i.e., to feel ing through 
w h i c h the object is regarded as a n object of del ight (which 
involves no cogni t ion of the object)." Nonetheless, the 
aesthetic experience is communicable : 
T h e cognitive powers brought into play by this 
representation [i.e., the representation of beauty] are 
here engaged i n a free play, since no definite concept 
restricts them to a part icular rule of cogni t ion . 
Hence the mental state i n this representation must 
be one of a feeling of the free play of the powers of 
representation i n a g iven representation for a cogni -
t ion i n general. 5 
T h e free and harmonious interplay of my mental facul-
ties constitutes what we may cal l the "experience of 
beauty:" a m f u l l y al ive and present, as I am i n myself, as a 
feeling, i m a g i n i n g , and t h i n k i n g subject, non-intent ion-
a l ly responsive to a t h i n g other than myself, w h i c h is fu l ly 
present to me i n its intrinsic being; I perceive its purposive 
form without attaching any purpose, cognitive or other-
wise, to i t . 6 
In the present context I am ignor ing many aspects of 
Kant's " A n a l y t i c of the B e a u t i f u l . " What matters here is 
the account of an aesthetic experience as an occurrence i n 
w h i c h the subject non-intentionally and immediately 
responds to an other entity, so that the subject is ful ly and 
freely present i n response to a th ing (which is not deter-
mined i n any respect), and the thing's being is fu l ly (unre-
stricted by any predicates) disclosed i n the subject's percep-
t ion. I a m ful ly and freely aware of myself (my being), and 
this is unrestricted existential, therefore nonconceptual, 
awareness. In a moment of a (Kantian) aesthetic expe-
rience neither my being, nor that of the object w h i c h is 
found beautiful , is i n any way determined. Beauty, strictly 
speaking, is not a predicate. A judgment of beauty is 
expression and communicat ion of the free and harmon-
ious interplay of my mental faculties, of my momentari ly 
unrestricted being. Despite its inte l l ig ib i l i ty there cannot 
be objective criteria for the truth or falsity of such a judg-
ment. Its truth rests o n " a state of free play of the cognitive 
faculties attending a representation..." 7 , and o n the mere 
undetermined presence of an other particular i n my per-
ceptual f ield. 
A n occurrence of feeling of the free and harmonious 
interplay of my faculties i n the unrestricted presence of an 
other particular is a perfect moment. T h e characterization 
of a perfect moment may have to be given a richer founda-
t ion than Kant's account of beauty provides; but, we can be 
guided by it for the time being. 8 
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In perfect moments I and the other particular (whether 
inanimate or self) are l ike Leibnizean monads: nonrela-
t ionally, immediately responsive to each other. I and the 
other particular communicate merely by virtue of our 
intr insic being. We are indeterminately present to each 
other, each appearing from its being, each appearing as it 
is i n itself, an unconnected (undetermined, unrestricted), 
fu l ly disclosed phenomenon; the phenomenon is the 
thing-in-itself, i.e., it is seen " i n its uncoveredness." 9 
M y life cannot be a string of such moments. O n l y 
through memory can such moments be entered onto the 
c o n t i n u u m of my life. By remembering them I change 
their nature from an occurrence of merely being to (an 
intentional object of) an experience. 
A n d approach to the meaning restores the experience 
In a different form, beyond any meaning 
We can assign to happiness. 1 0 
Perfect moments are not points on a temporal conti-
n u u m ; given their indeterminacy they cannot be charac-
terized by temporal predicates. T h e y are i n time, without 
being interrelated o n the c o n t i n u u m of time; they are not 
" invo lved wi th past fu ture" 1 1 . A perfect moment is the 
moment i n and out of t ime. 1 2 
Hegel makes the same point . Determinations of the life 
of personal consciousness by means of concepts and on the 
basis of general proposit ions do not capture its (existen-
tial) essence. T h e essence of my or any individual 's being 
transcends conceptualizable relations and distinctions: 
Essence is in f in i ty as the supersession (Aufgehoben-
sein) of a l l distinctions, the pure movement of axial 
rotation, its self-repose being an absolutely restless 
inf in i ty ; [it is] independence itself, i n w h i c h the 
differences of the movements are resolved, the sim-
ple essence of T i m e w h i c h , i n this equality w i t h 
itself, has the stable shape (Gestalt) of Space. 1 ' 
It is i n perfect moments that "the simple self-subsistent 
existence for consciousness" 1 1 is uncovered, and that "the 
native realm of t r u t h " 1 5 is l a i d bare. 
T h e being of what is merely "meant " [Das Sein der 
Meinung] , the singleness and the universality, op-
posed to it, of perception, as also the empty inner 
being of the understanding, these are no longer 
Essences, but are. ..abstractions or distinctions w h i c h 
at the same time have no reality for consciousness 
itself, and are purely vanish ing essences. T h u s it 
seems that only the p r i n c i p a l moment [i.e., pr inc i -
pal aspect] has been lost, viz. the simple self-
subsistent existence for consciousness. But in point 
of fact self-consciousness is the reflection out of the 
being of the wor ld of sense and perception, and is 
essentially the return from otherness.16 
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Self-reflection may (help to) uncover my being (the 
nonproposit ional truth of my being), as concepts may 
(help to) uncover or conceal the be ing of particulars i n my 
environment. Hegel speaks of self-consciousness as "the 
native realm of t ruth . " 
For the in-itself is consciousness; but equally i t is 
that for w h i c h an other (the in-itself) is; and it is for 
consciousness that the in-itself of the object, and the 
being of the object for an other, are one and the 
same; the " I " is the content of the connection and 
the connect ing itself. Opposed to a n other, the " I " is 
its o w n self, and at the same time it over-arches this 
other w h i c h , for the " I " is equally only the " I " 
itself. 1 ' 
T r u t h is rooted i n "the single self-subsistent existence 
for consciousness" 1 8 , that is i n the self as ful ly and freely 
present. T r u t h on this level is not acquired by any skil ls for 
f i n d i n g truth, but it is immediately given. It is the truth of 
anro<t>avoif, of how things show themselves from w i t h i n 
their being: as they are i n themselves 1 9. 
I characterized occurrences i n a h u m a n life i n w h i c h a 
phenomenon is a th ing perceived in-itself ( in its intr insic 
being) as perfect moments; and, I showed that h u m a n life 
cannot possibly be a string of such moments. Perfect 
moments are not temporal; they are not on the stream of 
consciousness. T h e (nontemproal) life of a bearer of (Kan-
tian) intellectual i n t u i t i o n could be characterized as a 
string of perfect moments. For perfect moments to be tied 
to the h u m a n context of self-reflection is for them to occur 
i n lives of essential imperfection and finitude. 
Perfect moments are, I propose, moments of attention 
without intent ion. M u r d o c h , i n The Sovereignty of Good, 
shows that attention is an essential component of both 
h u m a n knowledge and mora l i ty 2 0 . She defines attention as 
love for the particular. Love is immediate knowledge of 
the being of the particular. A n y degree of attention to a 
part icular is that degree of freedom from concepts and 
explanations, f rom previously established o p i n i o n s , 
beliefs, and knowledge w h i c h provide a general frame-
work for the description of the particular. Attention is 
liberty f rom intention. 
However, intentionality is essential to being a self; 
therefore, so is (the capacity for) self-reflection. T o be a 
self, i.e., a conscious and self-conscious entity, precludes 
the possibil i ty of l i v i n g by attention alone. It precludes the 
possibi l i ty of relating to any one particular by attention 
alone. Strictly speaking, attention without intention is not 
a relation at a l l ; it is immediate response to another, by 
virtue of the being (the intrinsic existential nature) of each 
other. Complete attention, without intention, to the being 
of a particular is immediate and complete v is ion of that 
part icular as being; it is not discursive understanding, not 
proposit ional knowledge. It is knowledge by acquain-
tance w h i c h cannot be transformed into knowledge by 
description. It is not subject to rules. T h o u g h completely 
spontaneous, it is not an intentional act. It is, one might 
say, a spontaneous imaginative act. T o live i n a perfect 
moment is to be a momentary bearer of (Kantian) intellec-
tual i n t u i t i o n . 
Perfect m o m e n ts are self-less occurrences. I do not mean 
experiences of self-denial or self-abnegation, i.e., of estab-
l i s h i n g a hierarchy i n favour of other people's needs over 
one's o w n . Self-denial or self-abnegation is a self-reflective, 
self-conscious act. By contrast w i t h self-abnegation perfect 
moments, aesthetic experiences for instance, are selfless i n 
that I am aware of myself merely as being (I am existen-
t ial ly aware), but not conscious of myself as an object of 
self-reflection. T h e self-loss is merely objective, and makes 
r o o m for complete subjective being. I consequently do not 
agree w i t h Murdoch 's c l a i m that i n such moments I "cease 
to b e " 2 1 . O n the contrary. In such moments my being is 
completely free of its (relational) object-status i n the 
wor ld . 
Even though complete attention occurs on ly i n perfect 
moments, attention is an essential component of a l l expe-
riences. T o reflect o n things and to describe or e x p l a i n 
them (to tell stories of my experiences of them) entails that 
they are given, presented i n consciousness. In order to 
reflect on what is given i n consciousness I must attend to 
it, i.e., I must be aware of it as given i n my consciousness. 
T h i s attentional component is necessary for a l l experien-
ces, and necessarily subjective. T o discount this compo-
nent i n one's account of one's experience is to misrepres-
ent one's experience. Even though it cannot be concept-
ual ly represented, it must not be dissociated from one's 
conceptual representation of one's experience. T h e u n i o n 
cannot be accounted for i n terms of objective criteria; but it 
must be felt. 
Attent ion to any one part icular is an pr inc ip le an i n f i -
nite process. A n y part icular constitutes what M i l a n K u n -
dera calls "the second i n f i n i t y " 2 2 , the inf in i ty of the being 
of any i n d i v i d u a l . 2 3 
A p a r t f rom perfect moments, w h i c h are not o n the 
stream of consciousness, attending to the being of an other 
i n the course of my cont inuous intentional consciousness, 
does not and cannot amount to attaining a complete 
v is ion of the other. 2 4 Attent ion is a manifestation of Bereit-
schaft (being prepared) for unrestricted vis ion (complete 
nonproposi t ional knowledge) of another entity, of open-
ness and hope for perfect moments. Such hopes, given the 
nature of perfect moments, cannot be expectations; for 
expectation entails intentional i ty . Such visions, being dis-
sociated from self-reflection, cannot be subject to p lan-
n i n g and self-control. They may be sources of energy and 
new direction of self-determination, but they are not 
moments of self-determination. I do not determine my 
existence; I only determine, to some extent, the course of 
my life. 
N o t to continue from a perfect moment, to consider it 
merely as an end and a complet ion is to discontinue one's 
life as a self. Such moments of complet ion must also be 
beginnings. T o want the moment to stay is to forgo the 
capacity for self-determination, is to forgo freedom. Faust 
considers himself given up to Mephistopheles, should he 
ever say to the moment: "Verwei le doch, du bist s o s c h o n " 
(Oh, stay, you are so beautiful) . 2 5 . 
What is essential to ourselves, viz. self-reflection i n 
respect of our continuity i n past and future, restricts our 
being. What constitutes my identity does not reach my 
being. 
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Perfect moments constitute a variety of self-loss. They 
are perfect merely i n the context of an essentially self-
reflective life. Such self-loss is not self-determined (perfect 
moments are not self-determined i n any respect). T h e 
self-loss induced by recalling them merely as an end and 
not also as a beginning ("Verweile doch, d u bist so 
schon") is however self-induced. 
T h e self-loss of perfect moments is to be contrasted w i t h 
what Kierkegaard calls the aesthetic phase of conscious-
ness. 2 6 T h i s phase (Don Juan is Kierkegaard's paradigm) 
consists i n l iv ing disconnectedly from moment to moment— 
moments w h i c h are constituted by immediate, unreflected 
perception, and unreflected pr imary desires based on such 
perception. D o n Juan immediately returns from the other 
to himself, act ing not on the being of the other, but o n his 
o w n unreflected desires. By contrast w i t h Kant ian aes-
thetic experiences, Kierkegaardian aesthetic moments are 
essentially tied to purpose (tied to impuls ive unreflected 
desire). By contrast with Kant ian aesthetic experiences and 
by contrast w i t h perfect moments i n general, they preclude 
attention to the being of the other; therefore, they preclude 
knowledge of, and love for, the other. Furthermore, they 
are dissociated from striving and hope for such knowledge 
and love. Kierkegaardian aesthetic moments could be sub-
ject to self-reflection and self-control. They are self-
determined. T h e self i n the "aesthetic phase" of con-
sciousness has forgone such reflection and control ; by 
forgoing what is essential to being a continuous self, he or 
she has induced self-loss. 
T h u s we have marked two distinct varieties of self-loss; 
both entail l i v i n g i n a moment of dissociation from the 
(self-reflective) stream of consciousness. In Kierkegaard-
i a n moments the self does not attend to the being of the 
other; the other is determined merely by the self's imme-
diate and unreflected desire. T h e other is an object of 
intent ion , not one of attention. T h e self-loss of intention 
without attention is tantamount to the self's disconnec-
t ion from the other as independently being; it entails the 
renunciat ion of self-reflectiveness, and thereby, breaks the 
self's continuity. O n the other hand, perfect moments, as 
shown, are moments of attention without intention 
through w h i c h we may be able to enhance our conscious-
ness and our capacity for self-determination. 
Aesthetic moments d la Kierkegaard are moments of 
disconnection from the being of others. In such moments 
the other is exclusively determined by the perceiver's 
intention/desire, not by the being of the other. T h u s the 
perceiver is disconnected from the other. If this is the 
pattern of the perceiver's life, he or she does not live as a 
self. If he or she succeeds i n determining other selves by his 
or her intentions and thus prevents others f rom self-
determination, he or she induces self-loss i n others as wel l . 
T h i s is the pattern of the Hegel ian master/slave situation. 
T h e master is unjust not pr imar i ly , if at a l l , because he or 
she breaks pr inciples of j ustice la id d o w n i n a moral code, 
but because he or she does not do justice to the being of the 
other. T o do justice to the being of another self, by atten-
t ion, is to refrain from us ing the other self as a means. I a m 
not, however, saying that attention precludes interest i n 
the other self, for instance i n the other self's capacity and 
ski l ls . It does not preclude concerns as to how the other can 
he lp me; i n short, it does not preclude interaction and 
cooperativeness, as l o n g as interaction and cooperative-
ness further and do not d i m i n i s h the being of a self. I can 
ask you to f u l f i l l tasks for me, as l o n g as I do not sever your 
capacity to f u l f i l l this task for me f rom the context of your 
being; I cannot insist that you f u l f i l l tasks for me. 
I may, on the other hand, do justice to the being of an 
inanimate , " f u n c t i o n a l " th ing , if I use it as a means to 
f u l f i l l functions according to my purposes. If I use it 
merely exclusively according to my purposes, without 
attention to its being, then I fa i l to do it justice. T o misuse 
a t h i n g is a failure to do justice to its being. I do not do 
justice to my table-lamp if I use it to put a n a i l i n the w a l l . 
A n y purpose precludes perfect justice to a thing, because 
purposes entail intentionality. Perfect jusdce to an inan i -
mate th ing consists i n a Kant ian aesthetic experience, an 
occurrence of f u l l attention without intention: I am free of 
any purpose whatsoever i n the face of the intr insic purpo-
siveness of the thing. However, such aesthetic experiences 
are perfect moments. They can strengthen and enhance 
my capacity for g i v i n g attention to the being of things i n 
the course of my life, that is, i n intentional contexts. 
Aesthetic experiences are "not the most important place of 
moral change," but "the most accessible o n e " 2 7 . 
A c c o r d i n g to Heidegger, to be a self " D a s e i n , " is to be 
"circumspectively related" i n one's environment. T h e 
pr imary mode of such relatedness is "Sorge," care, that is 
the str iving to interconnect w i t h entities i n one's envir-
onment according to their being. Funct ional things are 
" Z e u g , " present-at-hand by virtue of their intrinsic purpo-
sive being. T o use them i n greatest possible justice to their 
being is to know them, to br ing them "ready-to-hand." T o 
relate to selves i n greatest possible justice to their being is 
not to use them. It is to interconnect w i t h them i n mutua l 
recognit ion as selves. Knowledge of the other entails car-
i n g for the being of the other. " C a r e " is the u n i o n of 
attention and intention w h i c h is opt imal ly conducive to 
the correct v is ion of a being, and to moral action. 
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Perfect moments are moments of i l l u m i n a t i o n regard-
i n g my being and the being of other particulars. Remem-
bered, such moments can become sources of increased 
knowledge of my being and the being of others, and, 
therefore, of increased justice towards others and myself. 
Perfect moments are timeless moments of attention w i t h -
out intention, of being ful ly and freely oneself, i n imme-
diate response to the being of an other entity. They pre-
clude self-reflection and are, therefore, moments of ob-
jective self-loss. T h i s is a variety of self-loss w h i c h may 
enhance my consciousness i n time and my capacity for 
attending to my and others' being i n time when attention 
must be inseparably tied to intent ion. In other words, it 
may enhance my capacity for accurate v is ion of part icu-
lars, i.e., for knowledge of particulars w h i c h includes 
car ing. C a r i n g , I take it, consists i n j ustice to the being of a 
particular, rather than justice merely by principles. T h e 
self-loss of perfect moments may enhance my mora l 
freedom. 
Disconnected moments of intention without attention, 
Kierkegaardian aesthetics moments, are also without self-
reflection. They occur o n the c o n t i n u u m of consciousness, 
i n time. T h e self, e.g., D o n Juan, disconnects himself f rom 
others by letting others be determined merely by his unre-
flected desires. Consequently, he diminishes his o w n 
being and moves toward self-loss, the loss of being a self. 
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not even a memory. Existence everywhere, infinitely, in excel], 
for ever and everywhere; existence —which is limited only by 
existence. (Sartre, p. 133) 
Given that experiences combine immediate felt (subjective) quali-
ties and mediate, reflective (conceptual, objective) factors, a perfect 
moment is not, strictly speaking, an experience. Such moments, 
contrary to Anny's view, cannot be expected, planned or attained 
according to rules or skills. They are indeterminate. 
9. Heidegger, pp. 260-164. 
10. Eliot, "Four Quartets," p. 208. 
11. Eliot, p. 192. 
12. For most of us, there is only the unattended 
Moment, the moment in and out of time, 
The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight, 
The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightning 
Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply 
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music 
While the music lasts. These are only hints and guesses. 
Hints followed by guesses; and the rest 
Is prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action. 
The hint half guessed, the gift half understood, is Incarnation. 
Here the impossible union 
Of spheres of existence is actual, 
Here the past and future 
Are conquered, and reconciled, 
Eliot, pp. 212-132 
13. Hegel, p. 106. This can be read as an account of what Kant means by 
pure intuition of Time (by contrast with Time as a pure form of 
intuition). 
14. Hegel, p. 105. 
15. Hegel, p. 104. 
16. Hegel, pp. 104-105. 
17. Hegel, p. 104. 
18. Hegel, p. 105. 
19. Heidegger, pp. 261 -263. 
20. Murdoch, pp. 40-42, 54-56. 
21. Murdoch, p. 59. 
22. Kundera, p. 203. 
23. What Beethoven discovered in his variations was another space and 
another direction. In that sense they are a challenge to undertake the 
journey, another invitation au voyage. 
The variation form is the form of maximum concentration. It 
enables the composer to limit himself to the matter at hand, to go 
straight to the heart of it. The subject matter is a theme, which often 
consists of no more than sixteen measures. Beethoven goes as deeply 
into those sixteen measures as if he had gone down a mine to the 
bowels of the earth. 
The journey to the second infinity is no less adventurous than the 
journey of the epic, and closely parallels the physicist's descent into 
the wondrous innards of the atom. With every variation Beethoven 
moves farther and farther from the original theme, which bears no 
more resemblance to the final variation than a flower to its image 
under the microscope. 
Man knows he cannot embrace the universe with all its suns and 
stars. But he finds it unbearable to be condemned to lose the second 
infinity as well, the one so close, so nearly within reach. Tamina lost 
the infinity of her love, I lost my father, we all lose in whatever we 
do, because if it is perfection we are after, we must go to the heart of 
the matter, and we can never quite reach it. 
That the external infinity escapes us we accept with equanimity; the 
guilt over letting the second infinity escape follows us to the grave. 
While pondering the infinity of the stars, we ignore the infinity of 
our father. 
It is no wonder, then, that the variation form became the passion of 
the mature Beethoven, who (like Tamina and like me) knew all too 
well that there is nothing more unbearable than losing a person we 
have loved—those sixteen measures and the inner universe of the 
infinite possibilities. 
Kundera, pp. 164-165 
24. Attention is constitutive of human freedom, of moral choice and 
responsibility. 
Freedom is not strictly the exercise of the will , but rather the 
experience of accurate vision which, when this becomes approp-
riate, occasions action. (Murdoch, p. 67). 
Compare also Murdoch (p. 91): 
H u m a n beings are far more complicated and enigmatic and 
ambiguous than language and mathematical concepts, and self-
ishness operates in a much more devious and frenzied manner in 
our relations with them. Ignorance, muddle, fear, wishful think-
ing, lack of tests often make us feel that moral choice is some-
thing arbitrary, a matter for personal will rather than for atten-
tive study. Our attachments tend to be selfish and strong, and the 
transformation of our lives from selfishness to unselfishness is 
sometimes hard even to conceive of. Yet is the situation really so 
different? Should a retarded child be kept at home or sent to an 
institution? Should an elderly relation who is a trouble-maker be 
cared for asked to be away? Should an unhappy marriage be 
continued for the sake of the children? Should I leave my family 
25. 
26. 
27. 
in order to do political work? Should I neglect them in order to 
practise my art? The love which brings the right answer is an 
exercise of justice and realism and really looking. The difficulty 
is to keep the attention fixed upon the real situation and to 
prevent it from returning surreptitiously to the self with conso-
lations of self-pity, resentment, fantasy and despair. The refusal 
to attend may even induce a fictitious sense of freedom: I may as 
well toss a coin. Of course virtue is good habit and dutiful action. 
But the background condition of such habit and such action, in 
human beings, is a just mode of vision and a good quality of 
consciousness. It is a task to come to see the world as it is. 
Goethe, pp. 104, 105. 
cp. S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling. 
Murdoch, p. 85. 
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Prayer - for Joan 
What do you think J? We've done pretty wel l , I suppose; 
we've managed this far pretty easily, 
when you consider.... 
Sarah T . 
w i t h her secret abortion 
out of town 
& M o w i t h her illness 
w h i c h everyone refuses to call 
a nervous breakdown 
& Marsha whose Mother's 
about to die (the B i g C , I think 
but no one w i l l say) 
& Jane, whose m a n 
just u p and went 
away 
& and Andrea? Al l i son? 
-something like that-
your friend who's n o w 
a whore 
& Astr id 
onto her second c h i l d 
w i t h a m a n she doesn't k n o w 
anymore 
O u r o w n little troubles—Cystitis, the body's revenge 
Mora l i s t i c O l d B i t c h that she is—are really quite s m a l l 
retribution (for being women). 
But worry not, these murmur ings , 
these tiny beads of discontent, 
these small hard pellets of rose petals—crushed 
then rol led through anxious finger, 
strung together, knotted i n between— 
these countless, counting, counters; sacred sores, 
these shibboleths 
(" Ye w i l l know them by their grievances") 
are but 
the beads 
of one lone 
woman's 
rosary 
and many more 
w i t h fo l low these, 
throught the Decades, 
each ensconced between 
the Paternosters 
and the 
Glorias . . . 
Kate C a m p b e l l 
E n g l a n d 
